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Farmers in developing countries have limited opportunities for borrowing to even
out variability associated with risky farm income, but they can save. A dynamic
programming model of savings is presented in the current paper which examines
optimal savings strategies for farmers, using a case study of integrated rice-shrimp
farms in Vietnam. It is shown that when savings are accounted for, the expected
utility ranking of diﬀerent risky farm choices may not diﬀer that much between
farmers with diﬀerent levels of risk aversion.
1. Introduction
There is a large volume of literature dealing with farmer risk aversion. This
includes studies that measure attitudes to risky outcomes (e.g. Moscardi and
de Janvry 1977; Binswanger 1980; Antle 1987), those that evaluate risky farm
management choices using commonly accepted assumptions about the nature
of farmers’ attitudes to risk (e.g. Newberry and Stiglitz 1981; Lambert and
McCarl 1985; Goetz 1993) and those that rank farm income choices without
imposing assumptions about the nature of preferences to risk (e.g. Patten
et al. 1988; Pandey 1990; Cacho et al. 1999). One aspect that these approa-
ches have in common is that they refer to variation or uncertainty in annual
income, with the underlying implication that the farmer gains his/her utility
from income rather than from consumption.
The literature on farm ﬁnancial management applies the tools developed in
ﬁnancial economics to analyse risky choices for sophisticated (developed
country) farm managers. For example, Barry et al. (1981) and Collins (1985)
examine farmers’ choices over a portfolio of risky activities, where oppor-
tunities for borrowing to acquire more productive assets is accounted for.
While this approach recognises the farmer’s ability to borrow against assets
to expand production choices, the focus on a single period outlook (the
model performs a mean-variance test on returns to assets in the next period)
still implies that farmers are myopic. In contrast, Collins and Karp (1995)
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decisions over a long term planning horizon and only care about variations in
annual income if they aﬀect the net wealth position of the farm. This
representation implies that the farmer has ﬂexibility to draw down and
accumulate cash against his/her net wealth position and so can manage
stochastic cash ﬂows. This is a reasonable approximation for farmers in
developed economies.
In developing countries, farmers do not have access to these types of
ﬁnancial management tools. In many cases, formal credit is only available for
farm working capital and on a crop-seasonal basis, and informal credit is so
expensive that long term loans for consumption are not feasible.
1 Hardaker
et al. (1997) argue that in such cases (i.e. where capital markets are
inadequate) then maximising the present value of expected income or the
expected wealth of a farm enterprise (as in the agricultural ﬁnance literature)
is not appropriate. They suggest that the problem should be analysed by
maximising the discounted sum of utilities derived from the variable income
stream.
Even though farmers in developing countries cannot readily access loans to
supplement consumption in years of low cash income, they can choose to
accumulate liquid assets in periods of high production as a safety net for bad
production years. Thus, the decision-making problem is somewhere in
between the Collins and Karp (1995) ‘borrow and save’ model, and the
Hardaker et al. (1997) ‘consumption equals current income’ approach.
An alternative approach is presented in the current paper which takes an
uncertain cash income stream and examines optimal savings strategies for
farmers with diﬀerent levels of risk aversion. Unlike the Collins and Karp
(1995) model, the opportunity for inter-temporal consumption smoothing is
one-sided, because borrowing is impossible or prohibitively expensive. This
means that the decision-making problem cannot be represented by simple
analytical models, but the numerical solution techniques that have been
employed to examine the problem of commodity storage (e.g. Williams and
Wright 1991) can be adapted to solve for optimal savings strategies.
In the present paper, a case study of a farming system that has recently
been widely adopted in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam is used to evaluate
risky choices for two diﬀerent savings strategies. The consumption stream
that occurs when farmers employ an optimal savings strategy is compared
with the case where no savings are used. If the ability to save is ignored when
evaluating the risky farm choices then the widespread adoption of a risky
1For example, in the case study area examined in the present paper, interest rates paid on
informal credit were 7–8 per cent per month (Brennan et al. 1999).
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Delta seems inconsistent with commonly held views about the risk averse
attitudes of semi-subsistence farmers. In contrast, when savings are consid-
ered, the adoption of the risky farming activity is consistent with a high
degree of curvature in the farmer’s utility function.
The outline of this paper is as follows. First, a brief description of the
farming systems used in the case study region is provided. The farm cash
income prospects from diﬀerent farming practices are then evaluated using a
model that ﬁrst estimates optimal savings strategies that maximise expected
utility from consumption. Expected utility results from the dynamic (with
savings) model are compared to the expected utility that is calculated from
the underlying cash income stream when no savings are assumed.
2. The risky farming problem
The case study described in the present paper is an example of an extremely
risky choice. Traditionally, farmers in the coastal areas of the Mekong Delta
have been limited to farming in the wet season because naturally occurring
saline intrusion in the dry season precludes irrigation. In the ‘rice-shrimp’
farming system, the farmers ﬂood their ﬁelds with this saline water and raise
shrimp in the dry season. Wet season rice is an important crop for meeting
rice subsistence needs, and any surplus is sold for cash. However, income
from shrimp production is, on average, the most important source of cash,
comprising 60–65 per cent of household income, with the remainder coming
from surplus rice sales, wet season cash crops and oﬀ-farm employment
(Brennan et al. 2000).
There has been widespread adoption of shrimp farming in the saline
aﬀected agricultural lands of the Mekong Delta in recent years. For example,
in a survey of 32 hamlets in Soc Trang and Bac Lieu Provinces in 1997,
Brennan et al. (1999) found that 98 per cent of traditional rice growing farms
now practiced some form of shrimp production. While there is anecdotal
evidence to suggest that rice monoculture farms have better rice yields (Tran
et al. 1999), more recent scientiﬁc research failed to ﬁnd any evidence that the
inundation of salty water in the rice-shrimp cycle aﬀected rice yields (Phong
et al. 2002). Rice monoculture farms also engage in other wet season cash
crops and sell surplus labour oﬀ the farm where possible, hence the main
diﬀerence between the rice-shrimp and rice-only farming systems is the larger
but risky cash income from dry season shrimp activities.
The main source of risk is in the shrimp farming operation because cash
outlays are relatively large and there is a high probability of total crop
failure. On the other hand, if survival rates are high, the income realised is an
order of magnitude better than the income of the rice crop. The nature of risk
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shrimp, and representative cost structures.
2 This allows illustration of the key
components aﬀecting income risk. There is, in fact, considerable variation in
shrimp farming practices on farms in the region which also aﬀects cost and
incomes from shrimp production (Brennan et al. 2000). However, it is
believed that much of the variation in survival is caused by endemic disease,
for which the farmer has no technology to control.
3 The eﬀect of this
‘exogenous’ variation in survival on income from shrimp farming is
illustrated in the schedules for two diﬀerent stocking rates in Figure 1.
The production economics of the farm household is treated very simply. It
is assumed that the only variable input to shrimp farming is shrimp seedstock
Figure 1 Income risk for rice and shrimp production. Source: Simulated from typical farm
characteristics reported by Brennan et al. (1999). Two shrimp values representing diﬀerent
shrimp stocking rates (postlarvae per square metre in parenthesis).
2Data used in the present analysis was derived from a survey of 212 farms in Gia Rai district
of Bac Lieu province in 1997. These data are reported in Brennan et al. (1999), and Brennan
et al. (2000).
3Biotechnologists have developed sophisticated testing technologies to check for the pres-
ence of white spot but such technology is out of the reach of farmers and hatchery operators in
Vietnam at present.
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4 Income from shrimp production is equal to revenue less
stocking costs, where yield depends on the stocking rate and the random
survival of the shrimp. Annual income is deﬁned by a stable component
(which is made up of oﬀ-farm income and wet season rice production
5) and
an unstable component, which is income from shrimp production. In order to
emphasise the diﬀerence between the ‘with’ and ‘without’ savings models of
expected utility, the focus of the analysis is on savings as the decision
variable. The analysis is conducted for diﬀerent shrimp stocking rates to
illustrate how increased (multiplicative) risk aﬀects optimal savings, and how,
as the degree of risk varies, so does the eﬀect of ignoring potential savings
strategies. Algebraically, the annual income ð~ Y YÞ derived from farm house-
hold activities is given by Equation 1.
~ Y Y ¼ K  ð Pu   CÞþO ð1Þ
where K is stocking rate, number of postlarave per 1 ha of pond, P is price
per individual shrimp harvested, u is random survival (number harvested as a
proportion of number stocked), C is the cost of stocking, per postlarvae, and
O is net income from other sources.
3. Managing consumption risk using savings
The purpose of this present exposition is to illustrate savings strategies under
conditions of zero expected growth in income. Thus, the literature on risky
choices in the context of stage of life (e.g. Hardaker et al. 1997) is ignored.
The model presented in the current paper ignores life cycle issues by
presenting an inﬁnite planning horizon, which implies that utility derived
from bequests to future generations is equivalent to the utility that would be
derived by the current decision-maker if she were to live forever. This allows
for the solution to be a savings rule dependent on beginning of year cash
funds, applicable for all years.
The annual income ð~ Y YÞ derived from the farm household activities was
described in Equation 1. Consumption in any period t is determined by the
identity:
4While farmers in neighbouring regions have begun to use more sophisticated technology
(e.g. supplementary feeding) and appear to have had better success with shrimp farming, there
is no conclusive evidence on the nutritional requirements for shrimp in these extensive farming
systems. For farmers in the remote district of Gia Rai, investment in shrimp can almost be
likened to a lottery. The analysis presented in the current paper uses data on shrimp costs and
survival from a ﬁeld survey of farms in Gia Rai.
5Because the rice crop is irrigated, yield is quite stable and the contribution of farming in
rice yield to variation in farm income is relatively unimportant.
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where ~ Y Yt is cash income in period t, St)1 is savings carried into the year, St is
savings carried out of the year, and g is the potential return on savings.
The farm decision-making problem can be speciﬁed as choosing a set of
savings decisions for t ¼ 1t o1 to maximise the expected value of utility, V,
deﬁned as:




t 1UðXt;St; ~ Yt YtÞ
"#
; St   0 ð3Þ
where r is a discount factor reﬂecting farmer’s rate of time preference (which
may be diﬀerent from g, the return on saving) and X is the state variable
deﬁned as:
Xt ¼ St 1 for t > 1; ð4Þ
and X1 is the farmers opening cash level. The utility function, U,i s









Making use of the recursive functional for inﬁnite-stage dynamic
programming problems, problem (3) can be written as:
V ðSÞ¼max E UðX;S;YÞþð 1 þ rÞ V ðSÞ ½  ðÞ ð 6Þ
Optimalsavingsareaﬀectedbytheshapeoftheutilityfunction,ordegreeof
risk aversion; the shape of the probability distribution of annual cash income;
and the decision-maker’s discount rate. There are a number of methods for
solvingthis problem.Forexample, anapproachthat hasbeenused toevaluate
similar commodity storage problems is to estimate the optimal strategy (or its
dual)asasmoothfunctionofthestatevariable(e.g.WilliamsandWright1991;
GardnerandLopez1996),wheretheexpectedfuturemarginalvalueofstorage
is estimated as a function of the amount stored. An alternative approach is to
calculate a discrete set of state/choice pairs using a general purpose dynamic
programming algorithm. This approach is applied here. The basic parameters
used in the model are shown in Table 1.
4. Discount rates
The choice of discount rate used in analysing decisions made by developing
country farmers is often inﬂuenced by the argument that the very poor have a
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a preference for avoiding low current consumption is reﬂected in the utility
function for the ‘risk averse’ farmer. Consequently, a discount rate typical of
social discount rates used in public investment analysis is used. It is assumed
that farmers do not invest their savings in interest bearing accounts and that
returns to savings are zero.
6 The eﬀect of varying the discount rate and the
return on savings is illustrated in a later section.
Figure 2 Illustration of eﬀect of risk parameter R on curvature of utility function.
6Brennan et al. (1999) observed that farmers held savings in the form of cash and gold.
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The GPDP algorithm (Kennedy 1986) was used to estimate optimal savings
as a function of the state variable, Xt. Results are illustrated in Figure 3. The
more risk averse farmer is likely to save more for any given level of cash
availability because of the greater disutility from reduced consumption.
However, it can be seen that even the less risk averse farmer will also save to
smooth consumption, although the propensity to save is less.
Table 1 Assumptions used in the farm production model
Item and units Value
Shrimp price dong per kg 100,000
Cost of postlarvae dong per postlarvae (PL) 100
Average weight of harvested shrimp grams 30
Expected yield kg per postlarvae stocked per square metre 33
Income from shrimp production million dong per postlarvae stocked per square metre 4.3
Other household income (million dong per farm) 1, 2, 3
Risk parameter R 0.5, 2, 3
Assumed one ha of shrimp growing area per farm. 1 AUD is equivalent to about 8,500 dong.
Figure 3 Optimal savings for diﬀerent risk parameters, where stocking rate is 1 postlarvae per
square metre.
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of consumption is shown in Figure 4. Compared with the consumption
pattern that would occur if the farmer did not save; the introduction of
savings leads to a rightward shift in the cumulative distribution function,
with a reduction in the frequency of very low consumption. The eﬀect of the
degree of risk aversion on the probability distribution of consumption is that
the more risk averse farmer has a steeper probability distribution of
consumption, with a reduction in the frequencies of very low consumption
and very high consumption. This is the result of a higher propensity to save.
5.1 Eﬀect of discount rate
The eﬀect of discount rate on the optimal level of savings is illustrated in
Figure 5. A high discount rate creates a disincentive to save, as expected. The
eﬀect of allowing a return on savings was also analysed and has the expected
eﬀect of increasing the marginal propensity to save. Just as varying the time
preference and returns to savings aﬀected the optimal level of savings for
diﬀerent risk aversion coeﬃcients, they also aﬀected the simulated prob-
ability distribution of consumption patterns and expected utility. However,
sensitivity analysis on the ranking of technology options (presented below)
Figure 4 Dynamically optimal consumption pattern for diﬀerent risk parameters, compared
to the ‘‘no savings’’ model.
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assumptions about discount rates.
6. Impact of the dynamic model on interpretations concerning
optimal technology
Expected utility analysis is often used to examine the type of technology that
would be preferred by farmers with diﬀerent risk attitudes. These analyses are
usually based on converting a given probability distribution on cash income
to an expected utility measure (e.g. Fraser 1992). It is demonstrated in the
present paper that such an analysis is misleading if there is no accounting for
the ability to use savings to even out the consumption stream. In this section,
expected utility analysis is used to rank three technologies, using both the
‘with savings’ and ‘without savings’ approaches. The three technologies are:
no stocking, stocking at 1 PL per m
2, and stocking at 2 PL per m
2 (the most
risky case). Analysis was conducted for a range of risk parameters and results
are shown in Table 2. Also shown is expected annual cash income ð~ Y YÞ and
the coeﬃcient of variation (c.v.) in income for each technology.
The ﬁrst column of results shows the expected utility calculated for the
‘with’ and ‘without’ savings cases, where the risk aversion parameter is 0.5.
At this almost-neutral preference set, the eﬀect of ignoring savings does not
Figure 5 Eﬀect of discount rate on savings, for R ¼ 2.
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stocking rate which has a much higher return but higher risk than the other
options.
Thetwoothercolumnsshowresultsformoreriskaversefarmers(R ¼ 2, 3).
Thesedegreesofcurvatureintheutilityfunctionareplausibleforpoorfarmers
because bad years impose extreme hardship. If expected utility were calculated
based on the cash income (rather than smoothed consumption) stream, it
would be concluded that a farmer with a risk aversion coeﬃcient of 2 would
prefertoadoptastockingstrategyof1postlarvaepersquaremetre.Thefarmer
would rank no stocking (the risk free option) ahead of the most risky (high)
stocking option. In contrast, if we allow for the fact that the farmer can save in
good years in order to stabilise consumption, the conclusion is diﬀerent. By
following an optimal savings strategy, the farmer can maximise utility by
adopting the highest, and most risky, stocking strategy.
Similarly perverse conclusions are drawn for the risk aversion coeﬃcient of
3, if savings are ignored. As shown in table 2, if expected utility is calculated
from annual cash income, it would be concluded that the farmer would not
adopt shrimp farming at all, because the high variance is weighted heavily. In
contrast, if an optimal savings strategy is followed along with a high stocking
rate, the resulting consumption pattern gives the highest level of utility
compared to the other stocking options. In fact, technologies are ranked in
order of expected income, because the variance can be suﬃciently dampened
by savings.
In the context of the above analysis, the widespread adoption of shrimp
farming in the region can either be explained by fairly neutral attitudes to
risk, or could be interpreted as being consistent with a high degree of
curvature in the utility function, where farmers adopt savings to dampen the
variability in consumption. Because these farmers are very poor it is not very
plausible that utility functions would be almost linear in consumption, as
Table 2 Preferred options under risk: with and without savings
Coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion R Calculated expected utility
Stocking rate Mean Y (C.V.) Model 0.5 2 3
0 2 (0) (No risk) 2.83 )0.50 )0.13
1 4.3 (93%) With Savings 3.90 )0.29 )0.05
Without Savings 3.78 )0.47 )0.16
2 8.3 (98%) With Savings 4.72 )0.24 )0.04
Without Savings 4.34 )257.70 )128788.00
Implied ranking of technologies (stocking rates)
With Savings 2>1>0 2>1>0 2>1>0
Without Savings 2>1>0 1>0>2 0>1>2
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that farmers adopting these risky farming practices do actively save
signiﬁcant amounts of liquid assets as a strategy for managing risk.
7. Conclusion
Regardless of whether farmers in developing countries are risk averse or not,
the models of farm ﬁnancial management that have been applied to consider
risky farm choices in developed countries are not relevant because they
assume that farmers can borrow or save to smooth variability in annual
returns. However, an alternative method that has been proposed for the
imperfect capital markets case – that of weighting cash income streams using
expected utility analysis, while ignoring the ability of farmers to accumulate
assets during bountiful years to smooth consumption in lean years – is also
misleading.
The analysis presented in the current paper demonstrated that it is
reasonable for a risk averse rational farmer to adopt a risky farming practice
if that farmer can save. The consumption pattern resulting from an optimal
savings strategy is much more stable than the underlying income stream. For
the case study presently examined, this meant that the expected utility ranking
was always higher for the risky choices that had higher mean returns, even for
very risk averse farmers. These results contradict the rankings that would be
made by estimating expected utility derived from consumption while ignoring
savings. The likelihood that the two types of models lead to diﬀerent results is
higher when there is a greater risk, and a higher level of risk aversion.
The method used here to analyse alternative stochastic income streams
could be applied to other similar problems, and the availability of the generic
GPDP software used in the present study means that the task of estimating
optimal storage strategies is relatively straightforward. The approach can be
used to evaluate income proﬁles for a range of technology choices and the
model presented in this paper analyses the case where savings is the only
method for inter-temporal consumption smoothing. With the addition of
another state variable, the model could be extended to consider other means
of transferring assets through time, such as storing physical assets like water
or fodder or mining the natural resources on the farm.
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